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An increasing number of regulators have adopted public disclosure programs to create
incentives  for  pollution  control.  Previous  empirical  analyses  on  monitoring  and
enforcement issues have focused their  attention strictly  on studying  the impact of the
traditional  monitoring (inspections) and enforcement (fines and penalties) practices on
the environmental performance of polluters. Other analyses have focused their attention
on studying the impact of public disclosure programs. An important empirical  issue at
hand is whether or not these programs can create incentives in addition to the incentives
normally  set  in  place  through  traditional  means  of  enforcement  such  as  fines  and
penalties. In this paper, we perform an empirical analysis of the impact of both traditional
enforcement and information strategies within the context of a single program. We can
thus provide insights on the relative impact of the traditional (fines  and penalties) and
emerging (public disclosure) enforcement strategies.
Our results suggest that the public disclosure strategy adopted by the province of British
Columbia (Canada) has a larger impact on both emissions levels and compliance status
than orders, fines and penalties traditionally imposed by the Ministry of the Environment
and courts. Our results however also demonstrate that the adoption of stricter standards
and higher penalties had a significant impact on emissions levels.
From a policy-making perspective, our analysis thus offers two important results. First,
the presence of clear and strong standards accompanied with a significant and credible
penalty  system does send appropriate signals to  the regulated community which  then
responds  with  a  lowering of  pollution  emissions.  Secondly,  the public  disclosure of
environmental performance does  create additional  and strong incentives  for pollution
control. These results  do suggest that both  regulation and  information belongs  to  the
regulator's arsenal.1.  INTRODUCTION
It  has  long  been  recognised that  the  implementation of  environmental  laws,
regulations, and standards has suffered from a lack of resources to undertake appropriate
monitoring activities, and reluctance to  use  stringent enforcement actions toward  those
recalcitrant  polluters.'  In  view  of  those  difficulties,  an  increasing  number  of
environmental regulators around the world have seeked to  complement or supplement
traditional  enforcement  actions  (fines  and  penalties)  with  the  adoption  of  structured
information  programs  (or  public  disclosure  programs)  by  which  the  environmental
performance of polluters is revealed. 2
Issues pertaining to the monitoring and enforcement of environmental regulations
have been the object of only recent and still limited analyses. On the empirical front, two
broad issues have partially been addressed. 3 First, an essential issue of interest is the impact
of the various monitoring and enforcement actions on the environmental performance of
polluters. Magat and Viscusi (1990) and Laplante and Rilstone (1996) have shown that
inspections (and the threat of  inspections) significantly reduce absolute levels of water
pollution emitted by pulp and paper plants in the United States and Canada respectively.
They have also shown that inspections increase the likelihood that plants self-report their
level of emissions. Gray and Deily (1996) have shown that increased enforcement actions in
the U.S.  steel  industry have  significantly reduced  non-compliance with  air  emissions
I We define  monitoring  as the process  of verifying  the firm's status  of environmental  performance  (e.g.
compliance  with  standards),  and enforcement  as the undertaking  of actions  (e.g.  fines and  penalties)  to
bring  the firm to improve  its environmental  performance.
2  Examples  of such programs  now  abound  in both developed  (e.g.  the Toxics Release  Inventory  in the
United  States)  and developing  countries  (e.g.  the ECOWATCH  program  in the Philippines).
3 For a comprehensive  survey  of the (limited)  empirical  literature,  see Cohen  (1998).
3standards. Nadeau (1997) has  shown that both inspections and enforcement impact the
duration of firms' violation of air pollution standards in the pulp and paper industry. More
recently, Dasgupta et al. (1999) have shown that inspections significantly reduce industrial
air and water pollution in China.4
A second issue is the impact of public disclosure programs. 5 Two types of impact
have typically been analysed. Analysts have examined the reaction of capital markets to
the release  of information pertaining to  the environmental performance of the plants.
Hamilton (1995), Konar and Cohen (1997), Lanoie et al. (1998) have shown that capital
markets react  significantly to the release of information: upward when the information
reveals a superior performance, and downward when a poor performance is revealed. 6
Other  analysts  have  analysed  and  shown  that  public  disclosure  does  improve  the
environmental performance of polluters (see Konar and Cohen (1997) and Afsah et al.
(1997)).
From a policy perspective, a potential weakness of the current body of empirical
analyses is their focus on studying either the impact of the traditional  monitoring and
enforcement practices or the impact of information programs. It is to be noted that none
of the  above papers  combine  an empirical  analysis of  the impact  of both  traditional
4 If traditional  monitoring and enforcement  strategies  appear to impact the environmental  performance  of the
plants, it then becomes of further interest to understand  the determinants of the regulator's  allocation of
resources devoted to implementation. Empirical analyses on this issue include Deily and Gray (1991), Dion
et al. (1998), Helland (1998) and Nadeau (1997).
5 It may be useful to distinguish between structured information programs whereby the information release
is part of a clearly articulated strategy undertaken by the regulator to reveal the environmental performance
of plants from unstructured information of the type one finds in newspapers, on a more ad hoc basis.
4enforcement and information strategies within the context of a single research effort. In
this paper, we address this weakness and thus hope to provide insights on the relative
impact of the traditional (fines and penalties) and emerging (information) enforcement
strategies.
Since July  1990,  the  Ministry  of  Environment,  Lands  and  Parks  of  British
Columbia, Canada (henceforth MOE) publishes twice a year  a list of firms that either do
not  comply  with  the  existing regulation  or  whose  environmental  performance  is  of
concern to the MOE. Simultaneously however, the Ministry continues to undertake legal
action for those violating the regulation. These unique features allow us to analyse the
relative  contribution  of  both  types  of  enforcement  actions  on  the  performance  of
polluters. To do so, we focus on the environmental performance of the pulp and paper
plants  appearing  on  the  list.  Our results  suggest  that  the  public  disclosure  strategy
adopted by the province of British Columbia has a larger impact on both emissions levels
and compliance status than orders, fines, and penalties traditionally imposed by the MOE
and courts. Our results however also demonstrate that the adoption of stricter standards
and higher penalties had a significant impact on emissions levels.
In the next section, we briefly describe the institutional and regulatory  context
currently in place in British Columbia, and the model we purport  to test. In Section 3,
both the estimation strategy and dataset are described. Results are presented in Section 4.
We briefly conclude in Section 5.
6 Analysis of capital market reactions to unstructured information release includes Badrinath and Bolster
52.  CONTEXT  AND MODEL
2.1  Context
Industry and regulatory context
Canada is the largest producer of pulp and paper in the world with approximately
33% of world production. Within Canada, the 23 pulp and paper plants located in British
Columbia account for approximately 30% of the Canadian production, with 6.5 million
tonnes of pulp and 1.5 million tonnes of paper produced in 1992. These amounted to a
total  production value  of approximately 4 billion dollars (CAN), 7 and  8.5% of British
Columbia's GDP. 8
Pulp is produced essentially  with mechanical and/or chemical processes. Mechanical
processes are usually more efficient in terms of the required amount of wood input to
produce a metric ton of pulp. However, the process produces a fibre of lesser quality than
chemical processes. These latter ones are therefore usually preferred. Both sulfite and kraft
are chemical pulp  production processes. Sulfite processes produce pulp  of high  quality
which needs to be washed, but does not require a bleaching of the pulp. However, sulfite
processes involve high production costs mainly because of the difficulty (or impossibility)  to
recover the chemicals used in the production process. Kraft processes produce pulp of very
high quality. Moreover, kraft offers the possibility of chemical recovery thus making it less
expensive to use than sulfite processes. However, kraft processes produce a pulp of a darker
(1996), Dasgupta et al. (1998), Klassen and McLaughlin (1996), Lanoie and Laplante (1994), and
Muoghalu et al. (1990).
7 In 1992, 1 $ CAN was approximately worth 0.75 $ US.
8  Province of British Columbia (1993).
6color;  this makes  it necessary  for the  pulp to be bleached  before  being  sent to paper  machine.
The washing and bleaching steps of the production  process are important sources of
pollution:  washing  produces  large amount  of biological  oxygen demand (BOD) and total
suspended  solids  (TSS),  while  bleaching  further  produces  dioxins  and  furans. 9 If the industry
is a major contributor  to British  Columbia's  economic  activity, it is also one of  its most
important  sources  of pollution.
In Canada,  jurisdiction  over water pollution  control is shared by the federal and
provincial  governments.  The basis of the overlap  relies on the Constitution  Act of 1867.10
Insofar  as water  pollution  is concerned,  the Federal  government  has played  an important  role
through  its Fisheries Act  under which  Pulp and Paper Effluent Regulations 12 were first
introduced  in 1971.  However,  these  Federal  regulations  were devised  in a way that resulted
in the bulk of the pulp and paper  plants  in British  Columbia  being outside  the realm  of the
regulation,  and  therefore  not having  to comply  with any of the regulatory  standards  defined
in the Federal regulations.
On December  13, 1990  the Government  of British  Columbia  introduced  the long-
awaited  revisions to its own pulp and paper effluent regulations.  Since then, each plant
must obtain a discharge permit in order to operate, and the obtention of the permit is
conditional  on the plant using a secondary  wastewater  treatment  process. Moreover,  as
9 See Environment  Canada  (1993)  for more  details.
'o The  involvement  of the federal  government  in matters  of environmental  protection  is made  possible  through
its  jurisdiction  over  fisheries,  harbours,  crinminal  law,  and  its residual  power  to legislate  for the peace,  order  and
good  government  of Canada.  The  appropriate  roles  and  responsibilities  of federal  and  provincial  governments
are the subject  of an everlasting  debate  (Kenneth,  1990).
Revised  Statutes  of Canada,  1970,  c. F-14.
7shown in  Table  1, the revised regulation considerably  tightens up the BOD and  TSS
standards for those plants located on the coast of the province (with the Pacific Ocean). 13
Table 1
British Columbia Pulp and Paper Effluent Standards
Pre and Post December 13 1990
(Kg / tonne)
BOD  TSS
Kraft  Mechanical  Kraft  Mechanical
process  process  process  process
Before  Coastal plants  30  20  17.5  17.5
December 13
1990  Other plants  7.5  7.5  10  10
After  All plants  7.5  7.5  11.25  11.25
December 13
1990  Port Albemi  4.2  4.2  3.9  3.9
While the effluent  standards were location specific (coastal vs non-coastal) and
process specific (kraft vs mechanical),  homogeneous standards were introduced in 1990,
with all plants but one having to comply with the same effluent standards, irrespective of
their location and production process. Note that the standards were considerably tighter
for those plants located on the coastal zone. Standards became effective over a period of
3 years, and all plants had to comply with the new standards by 1994.
Simultaneously with the adoption of the revised regulation, the MOE seeked to
increase incentives for abatement and compliance with the new set of standards. As a
result, fines under the Waste Management Act increased from a maximum of 50 000 $
(CAN)  to  a  maximum  of  3  million  $.  At  the  same  time,  the  MOE  declared  its
12 C.R.C. 1978, c. 830.
13 In 1988,  the Federal Ministry of Ocean and Fisheries had to put an end to shrimps and crabs fisheries on
British Columbia's coastal waters where 3 pulp and paper plants were located. In 1989, oysters fisheries  had to
be stopped in the vicinity of 6 pulp and paper plants. These events partly explain the introduction of tighter
standards  in 1990.
8commitment to pursue its recently devised strategy to publicize, twice a year, the name of
plants falling short of an adequate environmental performance.
Bristish Columbia's list of polluters
On July 13 1990, the MOE released for the first time (in British Columbia and in
Canada)  a  list  of  industrial  operations  (and  municipalities)  which  were  either  not
complying with their waste management permits (Part I) or which were deemed by the
Ministry to be a potential pollution concern (Part II). The Minister then declared that
the release  of  this  material  is  a  clear  indication  of  our  government's
intention  to  deal  forthrightly  and  decisively  with  pollution  concerns.
(MOE, Press Release, July 13, 1990)
For each entry contained in the list, the following information is provided: Name
of the firm, location, nature of concern (e.g. mining operation effluent, pulp mill effluent,
sawmill emissions), the reason(s) for which the firm is on the list, and the number of
times the firm has been on the list (e.g. second time on noncompliance report; fourth time
on the list).
In order to be listed in the non-compliance section of the list, a firm needs to be
significantly  out  of compliance  with  its  permit  requirements  and  standards.  Typical
entries (reasons) in this section of the list are of the following nature:
Exceeded permit limits  for total  suspended  solids in  July, August,  and
September;
Exceeded permit limits for maximum and average total suspended solids
in October, for biological oxygen demand 3 of 13 days in November and
for pH two days in December;
9Exceeded  permit limit  for opacity  for 4 of 6 months;
Incomplete submission of monitoring data.
Operations  of concern to the Ministry  were defined  as "operations  some of which
are technically  in compliance  and others were permits  do not exist or are not required  but
which by their nature cause concern to the Ministry" (MOE, Press Release, July 13,
1990).  Typical  entries  in this section  were of the following  nature:
Concern with possible  impact of effluent on Kitimat  River, especially  at
low river flows;
Close proximity  of landfill  leachate  to fish bearing  streams;
Odor problem related to the emission of sulphur gases from the effluent
treatment  system;
- Numerous spills and bypasses;
- sGrizzly  bears  attracted  by the disposal  of waste at the local landfill.
In 1993, a number of industrial facilities started to express dissatisfaction  with
appearing on the "pollution concern" section of the list, yet their operations being in
compliance  with their permit requirements.  Moreover,  the criteria for being classified as
"of concern"  were seen as being subjective  and inconsistent  across  regional  offices.  As a
result, this section  of the list was dropped  in 1994  and as of 1995, British  Columbia's  list
of  polluters covers only  plants significantly out  of  compliance with  their permit
requirements  (Figure 1).14
4 Province  of British  Columbia  (1993).
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2.2  Model
Following  the  traditional  paradigm  for  analyzing pollution  control  issues,  the
regulator is expected to set and enforce rules of environmental behavior. In keeping with
this  understanding  of  the  problem,  the  policy  analysis  literature  has  focused  on
appropriate roles for  'ex  ante'  regulation (standards vs. market-based instruments) and
'ex  post'  liability  claims  by  injured parties.  This  conventional  policy  discussion  has
focused almost exclusively on interactions between the regulator and the plant. However,
recent research has suggested powerful roles for two additional agents:  the community
and the market. Indeed, recent evidence throughout the world suggests that neighboring
communities  can  have  a  powerful  influence  on  plants'  environmental  performance
11(Blackman and Bannister,  1998; Pargal and Wheeler,  1996). Communities which  are
richer, better educated, and more organized find many ways of enforcing environmental
norms. Where formal regulators are present, communities use the political  process to
influence  the  tightness  of  enforcement.  Where  formal  regulators  are  absent  or
ineffective,  'informal  regulation'  may be  implemented through  community  groups or
NGOs.
Moreover,  recent  research  has  indicated  that  investors  are  increasingly
scrutinizing  environmental  performance  in  their  investment  decision.  Among  other
factors, they have to weigh the potential for financial losses from regulatory penalties and
liability  settlements.  In  recent  years,  the  importance  of  investor  interest  has  been
increased by the growth of new stock markets and the internationalization of investment.
For similar reasons, international and local suppliers of financing, industrial equipment,
and engineering services are increasingly reluctant to do business with firms known as
large  polluters  or  experiencing  problems  with  environmental  regulations.  Recent
evidence from  both  the OECD and developing  countries  suggests that  environmental
reputation matters for firms whose expected costs or revenues are affected by judgments
of environmental performance by customers, suppliers, and stockholders.'5
Once  we  introduce  a  world  of  multiple  agents  (and  consequently  multiple
incentives), there may be a need to rethink the regulator's  appropriate role in pollution
management. It may be that this role is no longer confined to designing, monitoring and
15  See Cohen  (1998)  for a thorough  review  of these  studies.
12enforcing  rules  and  standards.  Instead, the regulator  can  gain leverage  through  non-
traditional  programs  which  harness  the power  of  communities  and  markets.  In  this
context, there may be ample room for information-oriented approaches such as the public
disclosure of plants' environmental performance.'6
The  notion  that  such  a  role  exists  has  certainly  gained  support  among
environmental  policy-makers.  Despite  this  widespread  acceptance  of  a  role  for  the
regulator to provide environmental information, the nornative  foundations for a public
intervention of that nature have not been formally studied. In particular, the question of
whether and under  what circumstances environmental  information should be  publicly
provided has not been adequately addressed.1 7
From an empirical perspective, the impact of existing public disclosure programs
on the environmental performance of the plants largely remains  to  be  tested. To  our
knowledge, only  Hamilton  (1995) and  Konar and Cohen  (1997) have proceeded  to  a
formal econometric analysis of this impact; both of their studies however are based on
the U.S. EPA's  Toxics Release Inventory (TRI). We do not know of any other formal
analysis of other public disclosure programs.'8 Moreover, given the characteristics of the
TRI program, these authors were unable to account for the impact of the public disclosure
strategy relative to traditional form of prosecutions, fines, and penalties. In this context, it
16 World  Bank (1999)  elaborates  considerably  on these  concepts.
17 An exception  is Kennedy  et al. (1994).
18 Afsah  et al. (1997)  provide  statistical  evidence  of the impact  of Indonesia's  public  disclosure  program
known  as PROPER.  However,  the available  information  limited  them  to conduct  an ex ante - ex post
analysis.  They  show that  the plants object  to the first  public  disclosure  in 1995  reduced  their emissions  of
BOD by approximately  45% within  a period  of 18 months.
13becomes difficult to determine whether or not information can be an effective regulatory
mechanism relative to traditional forms of enforcement actions. As pointed out by Konar
and Cohen (1997),  "before information remedies are used more frequently as regulatory
mechanisms, we need to understand how they work and what effect they have on firm
behavior".
Hence, while recent  literature  appears to  indicate  a role  for  public  disclosure
programs,  it  is  not  yet  clear  whether  or  not  these  programs  should  complement  or
supplement traditional forms of enforcement. In particular, once the regulator can pursue
court actions, fines, and penalties,  is there still a role for public disclosure? Can public
disclosure  create further  incentives  for pollution  control?  Given  recent  research,  the
model we therefore proceed to test in this paper is of the following nature:
Pollution = f (Regulation, Traditional Enforcement, Public disclosure, X)
where X is a vector of control variables. In the next section, we proceed to detail our
estimation strategy and dataset.
3.  ESTIMATION STRATEGY AND DATASET
For the purpose of our empirical analysis, we use plant-level annual data from the
pulp and paper industry since this industry has a long history of environmental regulation
and generally offers the best availability of emissions data.'9
Over the period 1987-1996, 24 pulp and paper plants were in operation in British
Columbia.  After  discussion  with  the  MOE,  4  plants  were  excluded  since  their
14manufacturing processes were hardly comparable with those  of the other  plants. Five
other plants were dropped since MOE's  files were incomplete, especially over the period
1987 - 1990.
The variables used to estimate our model are discussed below; definitions, means,
and standard deviations are provided in Table 2. The dataset was entirely provided by the
MOE.  Most of the data came from public reports. However, data on emissions and limits
was provided to us upon special request, and involved a manual investigation of a large
number of files.
The analysis is performed for both BOD and TSS. For each of them, we use two
different  ways  of  defining  the  dependent  variable:  the  absolute  level  of  pollution
(ABSBOD, ABSTSS),  and  a measure of  the level  of compliance  with the emissions
standards (COMPBOD, COMPTSS), defined as:
(actual emissions - allowable emissions) / allowable emissions. 20
19  Magat and Viscusi (1990), Laplante and Rilstone (1996), Nadeau (1997), Dion et al. (1998),
Lanoie et al. (1998) also use the pulp and paper industry for a similar reason.
20 Allowable emissions (kg / day) are calculated as:  emissions standards (kg / tonne) times daily
production (tonnes / day).
15TABLE  2
Definition,  mean and standard  deviation  of variables
(plant-level  yearly  data  covering  15 plants  for the period 1987-1996)
n  I  _  |  |  STANDARD
I  VARIABLES  [  DEFINITION  MEAN  |_DEVIATION_|
Dependent  Variables
COMPBOD  Compliance rate for BOD  -0.08548  0.3075
COMPTSS  Compliance rate for TSS  -0.32015  0.37810
ABSBOD  Absolute level of BOD emissions (kg/day)  10479  13187
ABSTSS  Absolute level of TSS emissions (kg/day)  8687.4  6373.6
Independent  variables
OUT OF  Number of appearances (in a given year) on the polluters  0.26667  0.53532
COMPLIANCE  list under the heading  "out of compliance"
OF CONCERN  Number of appearances (in a given year) on the polluters  0.08889  0.35548
list under the heading "of concern"
REGUL90  Dummy equal to one when a plant is subject to  0.57037  0.49887
the new B.C. regulation, 0 otherwise
PROSECUTION  Number of prosecutions  faced by a plant in a given year  0.93333  2.4834
FINE  Total amount of fines imposed on a plant in a given year  4314.1  16529
Control Variables
PRODUCTION  Production in tons/day  1132.5  510.54
BASSIN  Dummy variables capturing the river in which the plant
rejects its effluents
Fraser River (omitted)  0.33333  0.47316
1.  Vancouver Bassin  0.26667  0.44386
2.  Howe Sound River  0.13333  0.47316
3.  Columbia Lake  0.06667  0.06268
4.  Skeena River  0.06667  0.06268
5.  Peace River  0.13333  0.11642
REGION  Dummy variable capturing the B.C. administrative region
where the plant is located
Vancouver Island Region (omitted)  0.26667  0.40386
1.  Lower Mainland Region  0.20000  0.40149
2.  Southern Interior Region  0.06667  0.25037
3.  Cariboo Region  0.06667  0.25037
4.  Skeena Region  0.06667  0.25037
5.  Northern Interior Region  0.26667  0.44386
6.  Kootenay Region  0.06667  0.25037
PROCESS  Dummy equal to 1 if the plant has a mechanical process, 0  0.80000  0.40149
otherwise  l
16Observe in Figure 2 that emissions levels fell considerably over the period of analysis
and that compliance rate significantly improved.
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Our independent variables  capture the appearance  of  the plants on  the list of
polluters, the tightening of the standards in 1990, and the prosecutions and fines imposed
on the plants over the period of analysis. As explained previously, until  1994, the lists
published  by  the  MOE  were  divided  into  two  categories:  of  concern  and  out  of
compliance. Accordingly, we have two variables to capture the appearance of the plants
on these lists. Since two lists are published every year, and  since we are using yearly
data, we define the variable OF CONCERN  as the number of times a plant has appeared
on the lists under this heading in a given year  (OUT OF COMPLIANCE  is defined the
same way).  We also lag these variables to allow the plants some time to react to their
17appearance on the lists21. In our sample, only one plant never appeared on any list, while
another has appeared only once under the OF CONCERN category. On the other hand,
two plants have appeared seven times each on the thirteen lists that were available (six
times under the OUT OF COMPLIANCE category).
The variable PROSECUTION is defined as the number of prosecutions against a
plant in a given year, while FINE is the total amount of fines imposed on a plant in a
given year.  These variables are lagged to allow for some time of reaction.  From 1987 to
1996, there were 126 prosecutions against the plants in our sample; however, only 17 of
these resulted in a fine being imposed. These fines totaled 582 400 $. The sequence of
fines and appearances on the list of polluters is presented in Table 3.
A dummy variable, REGUL90, captures the introduction of the more stringent
regulation in 1990. As mentioned earlier, the regulation became effective over the period
1991 - 1994. Hence, the variable REGUL90 takes the value  1 starting only during the
exact year each plant had to operate under the new regulation.
We  also include  a  number of  CONTROL VARIABLES.  As  in  Magat and
Viscusi  (1990)  and  Laplante  and  Rilstone  (1996),  a  LAGGED  DEPENDENT
VARIABLE is introduced to serve as a proxy for the firm's  stock of capital related to
pollution control and for the general character of  its abatement technology. Firms with
21 As in Magat and Viscusi  (1990)  and  Lanoie  (1992),  the use of a lagged  policy  variable  may be justified
to avoid any simultaneity  problem.
18high levels of pollution in the past are likely to continue to have high levels in the future
because the nature of their technology makes it costly to achieve pollution reductions.
TABLE 3
APPEARANCES ON LISTS AND FINES'
1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996
Alberni Pulp and  2*OC  OC  OC  NC
Paper  Division  . soo000$  10i$
Prince Georges Pulp  NC
and Paper  65  000m  50  OOo
Celgar Pulp and  NC  2*NC  OC,2*NC  NC
Paper  5o0$
Crofton Pulp and  2*NC  NC  NC  NC
Paper  20000$  10000$




Harmac Pulp  2*.C  oc
Division
Mackenzie Pulp  NC  NC  NC  NC
Division  i5  0Qoo
Northwood Pulp  OC,2*NC  NC  NC
Port Mellon Pulp  NC
125000$  50000$  75  000$
Powell River Pulp  2*OC  NC  NC  NC
Division  200$
Quesnel Pulp  NC  NC
Skeena Pulp  NC  oc  NC  2*NC  NC  NC
Operations  65  000$
Squamish Pulp  2*NC  NC  NC
Operations  25  000$
Weyerhaeuser Pulp  NC
Mill  7500S  4000$
'NC:  Non-compliance; OC: Of concern; $: Fine
19We were able to account for the actual level of  plants' PRODUCTION  through a
calculation performed using two sets of pollution limits.  Indeed, the MOE produces two
series of limits:  one expressed in terms of  kilograms/tons and another one expressed in
terms of kilograms/day. Given that we were provided with both series, we were able to
calculate a measure of production expressed in terms of tons/day. To our knowledge, this
is the first time a measure of the real production is used in a study on pollution levels.
Previous authors, such as Magat and Viscusi (1990) and Laplante and Rilstone (1996),
used a measure based on plants' production capacity.  During the period under study, the
average production followed a somewhat erratic path:  a sharp increase was observed in
the first three years  (1987-1990), followed by an important reduction  in  the  1990-91
recession, then followed by a steady increase until 1996.
Two sets of variables  are introduced to  caputre the localisation  of the plants:
BASSIN  and  REGION.  BASSIN  refers  to  the  river  in  which  each  plant  rejects  its
pollutants, while REGION refers to the administrative region where the plant is situated.
Localisation variables  are useful to account for aspects such as varying importance of
environmental awareness  or lobbying across regions,  or potentially  different  levels of
monitoring  across regions. These differences may be  due, among other things, to  the
level  of deterioration  of the local ecosystems, or the potential for  local enviromnental
damages  (Pargal and Wheeler (1996), Dion et al. (1998)).
20Finally, a dummy variable is included to account  for the pulp PRODUCTION
PROCESS of the mill. The PROCESS variable is equal to  one when  the mechanical
process is used. Its coefficient is expected to be negative.
4.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The estimations are performed using a generalized least-squares (GLS) procedure
based on the cross-sectionnally and time-wise autoregressive model presented in Kmenta
(1986, pp.616-625) 22. Table  4  and 5 present  the results  pertaining  to  BOD  and  TSS
respectively. Each table includes eight specifications, four using the compliance rate as
the dependent variable and four using the absolute level of pollutant. For each dependent
variable, the various specifications allow for different sets of localisation variables, and
for  lagged  or  contemporaneous  environmental  policy  variables 23. Overall,  the
explanatory power of the different specifications is satisfactory, and the results are fairly
stable across specifications.
The appearance of a plant on the list under the heading OUT OF COMPLIANCE
has a contemporaneous impact on both pollutants. Indeed, all coefficients of the variable
OUT  OF  COMPLIANCE,  except  one,  are  negative  and  significant.  For  BOD,  the
appearance on the list leads to an improvement of 0.063 in the compliance rate, and to a
reduction  in the absolute level of emissions in the range of 1111 - 1164 kg/day. For TSS,
22 Initial tests  showed  the presence  of first-order  serial  correlation  and of heteroskedasticity.
23 Other attemps  were made  using  a time  trend, fixed  effects  or the plants'age as additional  independent
variables.  Their  inclusion  did not improve  significantly  the explanatory  power  of our  regressions  as
confirmed  by log-likelihood  ratio tests.
21the appearance on the list leads to an improvement of the compliance rate of 0.094, and
to a reduction in the absolute level of emissions in the range of 1225 - 1261 kg/day.
The significance of the contemporaneous OUT OF COMPLIANCE variable and
not of the lagged variable is not necessarily surprising given that two lists are published
each year (in some years, the first list was published in January). The appearance on the
list under the heading OF CONCERN seems to have no impact on pollution, which may
suggest that the MOE was correct to eliminate this category in 1994.
The  variable  capturing  the  major  change  in  regulation  REGUL90  is  almost
everywhere  negative  and  significant. The  impact  of  this  new  regulation  is  strong:
improvement  in  the  compliance  rate  of  0.158  for  BOD  and  of  0.07  for  TSS,  and
reduction of the level of emissions in the range of 3800 - 4511 kg/day for BOD and in the
range of 1291 - 1909 kg/day for TSS.
22TABLE 4
REGRESSION  RESULTS  - BOD
Coefficients (t-statistics)
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8
Dependent  variables  COWPBOX; COMPBOD  COMPBOD  COMPBOD  ABSBOD  ABSBOD  ABSBOD  ABSBOD
X  R SQUARE  F  .§947 0.8896  0  0  0.9002  0.8852;  0.8824  O.8841  0.8823
COMPBOD(1)  b  :  6-5  0.57159  0.64456  0.60413
(1371)  . (12.94)*  (4. 62)*'-  (13.53)*
ABSBOD(1)  0.65556  0.64247  O.662  0.64804
_  0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~1.7)*  (13.17)*  J13A0)W  _(13.27)*
PRODUCTION  49E.1  -0.89E-04  -79E.  -0.1lE-03  1.1544  1.5326  1.9  1.6450
(-1.1j7  (-1.59)  -1.A77)  (-2.094)*  (0292  (1.279)  _  23S4  (1.434)
PROSECUTION  026)E  0.35E-02  63.552  80.709
(0  2972  (0.4021)  ("223  (0.6493)
PROSECUTION(1)  -0.16fe02  -0.30E-03  -68.518  -66.051
.________-____________  (4163  7)  (-0.033)  . - (_ .5_  )  (-0.5244)
FINE  0.66E-06  0.78E-06  .431E-01  -0.32E-01
11  ,  (0.4725)  ( 1.78>  (-1.80)**
FINE(1)  _0.2E5  -0.33E-05  0_25E-01  -0.25E-01
... ____________________  ~(  1.9  (-2.033)*  (-1.560)  (-1.494)
REGUL90  -0.171  .0.17191  0.15814  -0.16664  43108  4511.1  -379.6  -4046
__  __  ___  (-3.774)*  (-3.981)  0  (5-194)*  (-4.708)*
OF CONCERN  53E-02  0.14E-01  -1098  -1059.6
0A115  (0.3187)  .0(-1.231).  (-1.19)
OF CONCERN(1)  -0.12E-01  -0.39E-01  -329.93  -250.39
_.0.27)  (-0.8782)  ,(43823)  (-0.2893)
OUT OF COMPLIANCE  .0.63E1-  -0.48E-01  -1164-4  -1111.4
§  ,1W  (-1.318)  . (-1.91)**  _
OUT OF COMPLIANCE(1)  -0-26E-0I  -0.3  lE-01  -22.08  -175.90
(4.6968)  (-0.8509)  .(-0.3993)  (-2684)
PROCESS  4.A4426  -0.16612  4.1  -0.14222  -1490  -2389.1  -13315  -2295.7
(w2"t  (-2.229)*  (-10"'  (-.87)**  (-1.056)  (-1.72)**  (-0.9626)  (-1.69)**
REGION I  -0.4SW-I  -0.39E-01  -1044  -645.30
(t7489)  (-0((.09870)L1.67  (-0.4414)
REGION 2  -0-305-01  -0.36E-01  -1657.1  -1261.3
(03371)  (.4A686)  (-0.9010)  (-0.7071)
REGION 3  -0.28424  437233  -2323,7  -2126.2
6 1.11)  (-1.34)  -1.141)  _  (-1.079)
REGION 4  0.84M  -0.97E-02  927.22  679.14
90Q0  _  (-O.lw05)  (_4213  2820)
REGION 5  OASFAI  0.  16E01  -683.79.  .482.87
(0.9108)  (0.294i)  (-0.5187)  (-0.3810)
REGION 6  W655  0.47485  473.26  331.74
____  ____  ____  ____  ___  1.41  )  __  ____  _  (0.9113)  (0.2119)  0  4
BASSIN 1  0.27E-01  0.38E-01  1799.4  1623.4
___  (0.5328)  (0.8045)  (1.336)  (1.238)
BASSIN 2  0.16573  0.16561  212.56  384.44
(0.9922)  _  (1.121)  (0.1913)  (0.3604)
BASSIN 3  0.78573  0.63661  1907.4  1548
(1.659)**  (1.193)  (0.9609)  (0.7398)
BASSIN 4  0.24E-01  0.24E-01  2278.8  1803.8
(0.1727)  _  (0.2563)  (1.134)  (0.8050)
BASSIN 5  0.40E-01  -0.92E-02  1852.5  1906.8
- (0.4148)  _  (-0.0985)  (1.051)  (1.143)
CONSTANT  -0.32M2  -0.15E-01  0.34E-0O  0.34E-01  4481.3  3089.8  3587.8  2438.6
(-0.3E-01)  (-0.1582)  (0.3339)  (0.3939)  (1.W)~'*  (1.667)**  1(1.515)  (1.345)
Fischer test  A,  ..  24.41*  :  25.71*  1  - 24.36*  - 24.79*
LIKELIHOOD RATIO TEST  190.93*  188.86*  19.88*  196.03*  93.57* . 91.61*  89.98*  87.88*
*  significant at 5%, **  significant at 10 %;  b (1) means that the variable has been lagged one year
23TABLE 5
REGRESSION  RESULTS - TSS
Coefficients (t-statistics)
9_  10  11  12  13  14  15  16
Dependent  variables  CM  S  COMPTSS  _  COMPTSS  AT  ABSTSS  A0STSS  ABSTSS
RSQUARE  0.9194  - - -- 8  0.9053  0.9380  0.9358
COMPTSS(1)  b  .9  0.75737  0* 124  (  0 72925
(il.43)*  ~(14.63)* (937)  (11.82)*
ABSTSS(1)  0  0  0  08  0 60083
PRODUCTION  -O  4i  -0i62E'04  '  -0.57E-04  2  1.6780  2(a32  .1067 4  *  .1.729)"  ~~~~~  (-1.49  3.(2.431)*  (3.058)*
PROSECUTION  - -0.26E-02  S  e 5  -23.552
-0488  -0.4436)  015  (-0.2872)  ____  _____
PROSECUTION(1)  . A  0;3421  -0.37E-02  5.9  62611
(-0.6278)  i"bi  i  (-07571)
FINE  :  J6s;0  (0.217E05  |05  5202  0.24E-02
P51.877)**  .4~  (0.2018)  ______
FINE(I)  .0S0|06,  Q:  0  _  X  -0.846  AMU  0.58E-03
-139a  (~~-0.9770)  (0.0508)
REGUL90  0IE0  -0.23E-01  A.6MM  -0.41E-01  Y-1291.4  -1745.2
REGUL90  t  :t  -0.8591E1  i  (-1.263)  (399  -3.139)*  (  '-4.165)*
OF CONCERN  8  '0.39E41  -. 697  43.531
f *1.95)**  -0.0.1020)  ____
OF CONCERN(I)  -3  -0.32E-01  _34653  -325.81
(-0.7600)  ___0_8024_
OUT OF COMPLIANCE  403E.O  `  -0.95E-01  MAM)  __  _12251  _
(-3.123)*  (3I62  12.413
OUT OF COIPLLANCE(I)  60  .452-0 1  4  5  48.26
(-367~  -1.381)  5(234  (119
PROCESS  10I4  -0.952-02  Y  78,  -0.24E-01  -105.85  M"  5'!  -118.17
PROCESS  8  ;  0  v  1 (-0.1842  19  *  -0.4512  )  (-0.1912)  8  (-0.2224)
REGION I  )  -05)2-01
REGION 2  0232,  0  0  2> .19  221.000
REGION 3  TM  Oi,,8t  i  gi  13
REGION 4  O  . 3  8  =8  7
REGION 5  iffl  1  10057
REGION 6  ,.i7  84A)  64989
BASSIN 1  -0.16E-01  -0.66E-01  i  -1131  . ......  | -1036.2
-0.4686)  IMP  1.84)**  '5  i  ii_____(17*______  _-.)
BASSIN 2  -0.11893  -0.95E-01  -609.6  -16163
-.9 **  (-1.28)(19)*(.8)
BASSIN 3  0.43E-02  -0.56E-01  . ii  -240.43  -382.15
R  0.052)  (-0.5679)WO  (-0.2720)  ~  '  (-0.4152)
BASSIN 4  0.94E-01  0.502-01  - MNME05  76)  1417.6  1323.9 ~U  ~~  1.252  1'0.3698)157  121
BASSIN 5  -0.234-01  2  -0.532-01  -890.29  -762.13
CONSTANT  9  -3$i  i 1  -0.53E-02  0.2324-01  (  4924  2216.7  867)*44  2  .
Mt -0.053)  1--  :51M  (0.3884)  .3499.  2.6)*  (.0  (1.993)*
FISCHER  TEST  i  30.60*  24.42*  35.45*  31.11*
LIKELIHOOD  RATIO  6&$03'  50.96*  54.13*  ,  83.36*  157Z'  73.93*
TEST 
________
*  significant at 5%,  **  significant at  10 %  b  (1) means that the variable  has  been lagged one  year
24As discussed earlier, the introduction of lower (more stringent) emissions standards leads
to an increase in the expected probability of being caught in non-compliance with the
negative consequences that may follow for firms. This, with a significant increase in the
maximum penalty partly explain the plants' reaction to the new regulation. As shown in
Figure 2, plants had a better rate of compliance at the end of the period with stricter limits
than at the beginning of the period where limits were less stringent. Discussions  with
MOE officials led us to believe that, with the new limits, all firms had to be equipped
with  "state-of-the-art" abatement technologies (secondary treatment).
PROSECUTIONS have  no impact on either  types  of  pollutants,  while lagged
FINES lead to an improvement in the BOD compliance rate (elasticity in the -0.15 / -0.17
range). It is instructive to compare the magnitude of the impact of fines versus the impact
of the lists. Strictly speaking, one cannot immediately compare the coefficients of these
variables given that the FINE variable is continuous and can be interpreted through the
calculation of a conventional elasticity, while the OUT OF COMPLIANCE variable is a
non-continuous dummy variable. Nevertheless, three observations can be made.
First, the appearance on the out of compliance list appear to have an impact on
both types of pollutants, each one of them expressed either in absolute terms or in terms
of compliance rate. On the other hand, fines have an effect only on the BOD compliance
rate. Second,  our coefficients indicate that doubling the average size of the fines would
lead  to  an  improvement in  the BOD  compliance  rate  of  approximately  15 %,  i.e. a
reduction of  0.013 in the compliance rate; on  the other hand, an additional appearance
25on the OUT OF COMPLIANCE list leads to a reduction of 0.063 in the BOD compliance
rate, which is significantly more important. Third, the fact that lagged FINES variable is
significant, while it is the contemporaneous OUT OF COMPLIANCE variable that is
significant, may suggest that the lists of  polluters can provide a stronger incentive than
conventional  enforcement  measures  for  a  quick  response  to  correct  a  damageable
situation. Altogether, these three observations suggest that MOE's lists could have had a
stronger impact than the fines as they were applied.
Among  the  CONTROL  VARIABLES,  the  lagged  dependent  variable  has
everywhere a strong and significant impact. The coefficients are in the 0.57 - 0.75 range,
which  implies  that  approximately  65  %  of  the  pollution  in  a  given  year  (absolute
emissions or compliance rate) is explained by the pollution in the preceding year. 24
The PRODUCTION  level has  a positive impact on the  absolute level  of TSS
emissions and a negative impact on the TSS compliance rate (elasticity in the range 0.22/
0.36 for the absolute level of pollution, and in the range -0.21 /-0.26 for the compliance
rate).  These results suggest that larger firms may be able to comply more easily with the
regulation  for  reasons  like  the  existence  of  economies  of  scale  in  the  abatement
technology.  For BOD, the same pattern is observed in the signs of the coefficients, but
only one of them is significant. 25
24  Similar results were observed in Magat and Viscusi (1990) and Laplante and Rilstone (1996).
25  Similar results were observed in Lanoie et al. (1998).
26The LOCALISATION  variables are rarely significant  for BOD while many of
them are significant  in the regressions  related to TSS. Lastly, the coefficients of our
PROCESS  variable  are everywhere negative,  and they tend to be more significant  in the
BOD regressions than in  the TSS.  This shows that, as  expected, the use of  the
mechanical process leads to  higher compliance rate  and lower absolute levels of
emissions.
5.  CONCLUSION
This paper has examined the relative impact of both traditional enforcement
practices and information strategies on pollution levels and rates of compliance. The
analysis was performed  in the context of British Columbia where the MOE publishes,
since 1990, a list of firms that either do not comply with the existing regulation  or that
are of  concern to  the MOE, and where simultaneously the Ministry continues to
undertake  legal action  for those violating  the regulation. The empirical  investigation  was
based  on a sample  covering  15 plants in the pulp and paper industry  over the period 1987
- 1996. Two types of pollutants  were considered: BOD and TSS.  Our results showed
that a tightening up of the standards in 1990 had a very significant impact on plants'
environmental  performance  and that appearances  on polluters' list led plants to improve
their environmental  performance. Furthermore, we provided some evidence that the
impact  of appearing  on the polluters'list  was stronger  than that of fines.
Our  analysis  suggests that,  although useful,  information strategies cannot
necessarily replace traditional enforcement practices in  the  area  of  enviromnental
27protection. In fact, these two approaches can be perhaps better be used as complementary
policy  instruments  in  order  to  achieve  improvements  in  firms'  environmental
performance. This way of proceeding presents the advantage of putting different types of
pressure (reputational, financial, judiciary) on firms, increasing the likelihood that they
will undertake actions in line with environmental protection.
From a policy-making perspective, our analysis thus offers two important results.
First,  the presence  of clear  and  strong standards accompanied  with  a  significant and
credible penalty system does send appropriate signals to the regulated community which
then responds with a lowering of pollution emissions. Secondly, the public disclosure of
environmental performance does create additional and  strong incentives for pollution
control. These results  do  suggest that both  regulation and  information belongs  to the
regulator's arsenal.
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